This paper introduces the term 'terraqueous territoriality' to analyse a particular relationship between capitalism as a social formation, and the sea as a natural force. It focuses on three spaces -exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the system of 'flags of convenience' (FOC), and multilateral counter-piracy initiatives -as instances of capitalist states and firms seeking to transcend the geo-physical difference between firm land and fluid sea. Capital accumulation, it is argued here, seeks to territorialise the sea through forms of sovereignty and modes of appropriation drawn from experiences on land, but in doing so encounters particular tensions thereby generating distinctive spatial effects. By exploring the articulation between sovereignty, territory and appropriation in the organisation of spaces where land meets sea, the article seeks to demonstrate the value of an analytical framework that underlines the terraqueous nature of contemporary capitalism.
emphasise the fertile interaction between 'territoriality' as a relation (or transitive verb), and 'territory' as a thing (or noun): the former denoting the wider range of strategies aimed at producing and regulating space(s), the latter referring to a more specific bounded space, of which the sovereign territorial state has been the dominant form in the modern period. The contribution is pitched principally in theoretical terms, building on our own and others' original research. We draw here and there on elements of our own fieldwork, including by Campling on the global tuna industry which has involved interviewing over 600 people representing capital, states and labour, as well as scientists and NGOs in over a dozen countries, and Colás' work on historical piracy and maritime empires.
Our argument is that each of the three spaces where land meets sea highlights certain experimental dynamics in capitalist development and its particular relationship to the global ocean. These are all, to be sure, fleeting moments in the constant metamorphosis of capital, but they might be seen as snapshots of places where commodity, productive and money capital are respectively reproduced. Once again, there is no mechanical or static correlation here as all of these terraqueous spacesthe EEZ, the FOC vessel and piratical area -combine distinctive expressions of sovereignty, territory and appropriation (of law, politics and economics). But for purposes of exposition it might be helpful to think of the EEZ as a specifically capitalist form of appropriation (property), the FOC ship of sovereignty (jurisdiction), and the piratical waters, of territory (spatial governance). What we offer below is an analytical framework, built around concrete illustrations, which identifies some continuities in the fraught spatial relationship between capitalism and the sea. Before doing so, the next section expands briefly on the theoretical assumptions guiding our analysis.
Capitalism and the sea: A terraqueous territoriality
The sea has been a protagonist in the development of capitalism from the very beginning. For one school of thought -most clearly associated to the work of Fernand Braudel -capitalism is a world-system emerging out of maritime trade during the long sixteenth century , premised on the accumulation of mercantile wealth in seaports like Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam and London. This is the historical moment that witnessed not just the circumnavigation of the globe, but also the consolidation of a world market with financial and commercial institutions which -in their use of words like 'flotation', 'liquidity', 'flows' and 'ventures' -invoke all the movement and risk of the sea. Marx's own famous statements on the primitive or previous accumulation of capital underline the place of overseas conquest, the Atlantic slave trade and commercial wars among Europe's naval powers in the 'rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production' (Marx, 1976: 915) . Even staunch critics of 'neo-Smithian' conceptions of capitalism like Robert Brenner (2001) 
or Ellen
Meiksins Wood (2002) acknowledge that, although capitalist social-property relations may have first crystallised in the English countryside, they were subsequently integrated into overseas commercial networks which bolstered and nourished the growth of English and later, British capitalism. Brenner readily accepts that the world market played a significant role in stimulating demand for manufactured goods and staples produced under capitalist social-property relations, while Wood has no problem in recognising that 'a great deal still needs to be said about how England's particular insertion into the European trading system determined the development of English capitalism ' (2002: 64) .
In the specific relation between land and sea, commercial capitalism (Banaji, 2016) valorised the oceans principally as a trade route -a surface that accelerates the circulation of precious commodities, and channels access to distant markets. The sea also acted as a venue for the trade in enslaved humans. But this was never a simple or automatic 'flow' and was instead characterised by friction, resistance and uncertainty (Rediker, 2007) . The associated delays and risk demanded the development of more sophisticated institutions of finance, insurance and information so central to the origins of commercial capitalism, and were important antecedents for contemporary financialisation (Baucom, 2005) . Moreover, as Lauren Benton's (2010) path-breaking work has illustrated, the maritime basis of commercial capitalism challenged any straightforward application of exclusive sovereign territoriality, creating overseas enclaves, corridors and brackish zones characterised by variegated, overlapping and plural legal geographies which in turn often influenced the organisation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation on land (the City of London's continued operation as a tax-haven 'city within a city' is a good example of this). The advent of industrial capitalism gave such exchange and mobility a fresh impetus as the sea itself became both driver and site for the generalised production of value (ship building and timber and steel industries, the mass employment of seafarers with disposable incomes, industrial fishing and whaling, mineral extraction) and, through technologies like refrigeration or telegraphy, deepened the integration between the circuits of production, trade and credit. Moreover, facilitating these new processes of wealthcreation and accumulation there emerged in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries a host of domestic, bilateral and multilateral institutions, as well as a body of public international and mercantile law, and conventions specifically aimed at regulating the global ocean.
The combination of these socio-economic and political activities in and about the sea has generated a particularly capitalist form of terraqueousness. It is characterised by an attempt to harness the constant circulation of 'value in motion' to the need of investing in fixed logistical and social infrastructure that can facilitate and smoothen such mobility. Whereas commercial capitalism relies overwhelmingly on commodity circuits ('differential accumulation' or 'buying cheap and selling dear'), industrial capitalism requires a more systematic integration of the three circuits of productive, commodity and money capital. The realisation of value under industrial capitalism thus necessitates the coordination of flows and stocks -managing the turnover time of capital -so that commodities can be produced, stored and distributed as well as exchanged and consumed (Marx, 1992; Newsome, 2010) . These logistical operations have tremendous spatial implications, as transport geographers have amply shown through the years.
In the popular imagination, the oceans seem to serve as the domain of commodity and money circuits par excellence, whereas land operates as the principal abode of productive capital. But this bypasses the centrality of the sea as a place where social relations are productive of surplus value in sectors like fishing and maritime transport which from the early eighteenth century represented a significant part of the capitalist labour force (second only to agricultural labourers and textile workers in eighteenthcentury England) (Linebaugh, 2003) . Such dense interconnections between peoples and places across commodity chains and frontiers gave meaning to the notion that 'Amsterdam is standing on Norway' (Moore, 2010) . Further, technological transformations accompanying the industrialisation of capitalism since the mid-nineteenth century -from steam ships to containerisation and food canning to deepfreezing -drastically reduced turnover time and enhanced the durability of internationally traded food, compressing the space and risk between points of production and consumption. For our purposes, the upshot of these tendencieshowever uneven in their manifestation -is that the fluid sea and firm land cannot be so readily distinguished in terms of their perceived qualities. Yet at the same time, the irreducibly geo-physical attributes of earth and water complicate any attempt at simply demarcating the sea along terrestrial lines that characterise the exercise of state sovereignty and accumulation of capital on land. These tensions and contradictions convey the form of terraqueous territoriality we are seeking to explore: a distinctively capitalist articulation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation which tries to transcend the land-sea dualism though a periodic enclosure and parcelisation of the sea, but which constantly encounters in the geo-physical force of the ocean a seemingly insurmountable obstacle that often resolves itself in the creation of amphibious and zonal organisations of space such as the EEZ, the High Risk Zone or indeed the ship flying a 'flag of convenience'. We turn now to our three illustrations of how capitalist states and firms mobilise and combine different conceptions and practices of law, politics and economics (or sovereignty, territory and accumulation) in an attempt at forging a terraqueous territoriality that can manage the existing world order.
Appropriating the sea: Exclusive economic zones
The EEZ is emblematic of the terraqueous territoriality we are positing in that it incorporates sovereignty (exclusive), appropriation (economic) and territory (zone) in its very title. The codification of the EEZ under UNCLOS III in 1982, after a period of acceptance in customary international law from the mid-1970s, was the single greatest enclosure in human history. EEZs cover 35 percent of the total area of the seas, and contain around 90 percent of the world's fish stocks (De Fontaubert and Lutchman, 2003) . They emerged as a terraqueous space during the postwar years, partly in response to capitalist innovation and development of distant-water fisheries and offshore resource extraction, but mainly as a result of Cold War geopolitical considerations, including the Third Worldist campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The outcome was a distinctive legal framework allowing coastal states to claim special sovereign rights (but not territorial sovereignty) over a given EEZ.
The sophisticated separation of the political (sovereign powers) from the economic (property rights) enshrined in the EEZ regime neatly reflects a capitalist logic where the sea is functionally exploited as a resource, rather than politically occupied as a territory. In a 1971 White House exchange between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger over a fisheries dispute with Brazil, the US President is reported to have asserted: 'Navigation we want. Let them fish if they want' (Kraska, 2011: 140) .
The implication being (more or less sustained by the USA and other powers since then) that so long as the principles of freedom of navigation and innocent passage for the world's largest fleets are upheld, coastal states can do with their marine resources as they please. But this stands only as long as these resources remain faithfully fenced-in by the lines in the sea drawn by the capitalist state system. 'Highlymigratory' species transcend these borders and made a muddle of Nixon's distinction.
The wide geographical flow of tuna species led to their categorisation as a 'highly migratory species' under UNCLOS III: 'stocks or stocks of associated species occurring both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone' (UNCLOS 1982, Part V, Art. 63, see also Art. 64). Therefore, while there is some empirical truth in the category of 'highly migratory', it is more of a politico-legal distinction rather than a biological one because of the definitional centrality of the territorial boundary of EEZs. As tuna straddle a range of international legal boundaries the biomass cannot be unilaterally controlled by a single state in the system of (legally) equal states: as such, highly migratory species like tuna can only be nobodies' property. The US instead relied on its geo-economic leverage to muscle its way into fishing grounds on behalf of the US tuna industry, which was a politically powerful player, punching well above its economic weight (Campling et al., 2007) .
But coastal states resisted. In 1984, the Solomon Islands state enforced its sovereign rights -landed-property -and arrested and confiscated US tuna boats fishing in its EEZ. The US response was to compensate boat owners and deduct the costs from Overseas Development Assistance previously committed to the Solomon Islands (Van Dyke and Nicol, 1987) . Kiribati upped the ante in 1985 when it signed a deal with the Soviet Union over access to tuna in its EEZ (Teiwaki, 1987) , which would have given the USSR a strategic foothold in the Western Central Pacific Ocean -a sphere of US influence. The US acquiesced and negotiated what for many years was seen as the world's most stable and lucrative tuna access agreement with all 14 independent Pacific Island countries, albeit continuing to refuse to sign-up to UNCLOS III.
As we'll shortly see, neutral, functionalist conceptions of the law of the sea generally, and the EEZ in particular mask the socio-economic contestation and (geo)political power dynamics that underpin this legal-property regime. The socio-spatial form of the EEZ also challenges a common view of the global ocean as a lawless frontier. There are, then, plenty of examples of how diverse global governance regimes and institutions seek to manage the global ocean in its surface, deepwater and sub-sea totality. The difficulty for many of these multilateral agencies lies in conjugating the liberal principle of the 'freedom of the seas' with the drive to secure sovereign property rights over, and the capture of ground-rent through these resources. The EEZ represents one such attempt at marrying unfettered mobility and legal appropriation, albeit with the sea in this instance serving as a laboratory in the experimentation with forms of overlapping governance that have subsequently been applied on land (Haas, 1990) . In this regard, it is helpful to understand the EEZ not just as an area or zone but also, as Gavin Bridge has suggested, to consider it in volumetric terms 'as a spatial form of property through which the circulation of resources and commodities is controlled' (Bridge, 2013: 57) . In contrast to a static, purely grounded conception of resources as 'fixed territory', Bridge enjoins us to think of 'quanta-based' rights to fish, water or other biomass as the principal way that capital can 'secure flow' (page 57). On our reading, the EEZ represents exactly one such spatial form, born from the desire to reconcile the private appropriation of nature under and through the sea, with the reinforcement of the public authority of state sovereignty on land.
The particular form of property rights that states have over fisheries production is a good instance of this confluence. The differentiation in types and degrees of surplus appropriation produced in fisheries systems depend, first and foremost, upon politics.
Distributional struggles can take place at different points in the commodity chain, In all these cases, the politics that unfolds between, across and within states is Marx's critique of classical political economy (especially of Ricardo) makes clear that ground-rent is a re-distributive portion of wealth (the surplus value produced in fishing activities) rather than a 'thing' or a techno-managerial issue that can be identified and 'solved' through policy. Like on land, oceanic property is contested, but under the novel spatial-juridical form of the EEZ the sea and its agents (human and non-human alike) do not conform to the 'jural forms' dominant on land (Bear, 2012) .
Similar functional idealisations of the EEZ as another sovereign space of purely technical, 'frictionless' accumulation are discernible in the extraction of resources under the seabed. In contrast to fisheries, the challenge for the capitalist valorisation of offshore energy and minerals is not so much one of mobility across jurisdictions, but rather the articulation of land and sea within a given coastal state's sovereignty.
The EEZ offers coastal states a legal framework to nationalise the rent accrued from offshore fossil fuel and mineral extraction, as well as bio-prospecting, much in the same way that states own the subsoil resources within their sovereign territory on land. To that extent, the EEZ does in effect act as maritime prolongation of the coastal he is presenting only a half-truth. First of all, it is a misconception to suggest there is no regulation in the shipping industry -as we shall see, FOC ships remain subject to (inter-)state regulation and political contestation, including that initiated by trade unions. Second, and moreover, such emphasis on offshoring as a facilitator of '"postnational" systems of contemporary mobility' underplays the fundamental role of state power in authoring globalisation through practices and policies of reregulation 3 (Panitch and Gindin, 2012, page 9). We deal only with the first of these directly here, but in doing so pick up on some reinforcement of the second claim. As with the EEZ, the relationship between sovereignty, territory and appropriation for FOC boats is full of nuance and complexity. within a bounded territory, serves to reproduce the territory that is being bounded'.
Even when falling under another state's 'static' domain of sovereign rights in an EEZ, the principle of comity means that the boat owner/captain are subject principally to the regulations of the flag state (at least in regard to labour standards on the boat).
Second, given that a characteristic of the open registry is the ability of shipowners to 'buy' a sovereign and thus the legal jurisdiction that regulates their activities, shipowners produce territory as an accumulation strategy. Shipowners use sovereignty invested in state jurisdiction to cut crew costs and undermine the self- In sum, the 'open registry' regime illustrates how fishing vessels in particular are never far off land when they're at sea: they carry with them all of the characteristics of a land-based labour process associated to say, mining -ethnic segmentation of the workforce, strict labour discipline, repetitive tasks, combination of workplace and lifeworld in a single confined space. Similarly, the open registry ship carries the jurisdiction of its purchased sovereignty in the FOC. Yet, while on the high seas, the ship is also a space within a space, moving the economic activity within its hull across a limitless surface. Workers producing value within and across these spaces, on the other hand, are subject to an altogether narrower territoriality -one defined by the contained, restricted and deeply hierarchical workplace that is the factory ship.
New territorialities of Ocean Governance: Counter-piracy
At first sight, the choice of piracy as an illustration of capitalist territoriality at sea might appear perverse. Piracy -and its legitimate sibling, privateering -are after all phenomena chiefly associated to non-capitalist, mercantilist empires. Despite its concentrated occurrence today in hotspots off western Africa, the Malacca Straits, Celebes and Sulu Seas and, since the 2000s, the north and western Indian Ocean, piracy remains a relatively marginal practice in global politics. Yet the incidence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and its environs has in the past couple of decades occasioned much geopolitical anxiety, and produced multilateral counter-piracy initiatives which are noteworthy in understanding the terraqueous territoriality of capitalism today.
Contemporary piracy is significant chiefly because it challenges the capitalist world order in at least three kinds of ways (Glück, 2015) . First, it can block access through some of the key maritime chokepoints in the global economy -most obviously the Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits. As we have seen, oceanic sea-lanes continue to act as the main conduits for non-bulk international trade, and delays in the transit of goods can cost firms very dearly at all stages of the commodity chain (Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2012) . Second, maritime piracy presses on an Achilles' heel of the capitalist world order, namely the ambiguous jurisdiction on the high seas. On the one hand, piracy is clearly an outlawed practice in public international law, yet on the other hand, even the most powerful states -America, China, EU members and Russia -constantly run into juridical complications in combating maritime piracy.
Washington and other western capitals have signed bilateral conventions with Kenya and Seychelles to avoid processing alleged pirates through their own domestic laws, instead outsourcing the task to courts in Mombasa, while China and Russia have been forced to deploy counter-piracy forces in the western Indian Ocean in defence of their own cargo fleets. Contemporary piracy has thus turned parts of the ocean-space into a laboratory for new multilateral forms of governance and force that are largely absent on land (Dua, 2015) . Finally, the experience of Somali piracy in particular has driven home the point that the high seas and unpoliced EEZs act as the dumpsite (both literally and figuratively) of land-side crises and pathologies -be they so-called collapsed states or the illegal disposal of toxic waste (Schneider and Winkler, 2013) .
The ocean-world appears in these cases as the space of exception, where the laws and powers of the sovereign state are seemingly suspended in order to address the peculiar challenges of sea-borne violence and illegal practices. To that extent, the sea presents itself to the dominant powers as a disorderly geopolitical sphere in dire need of In the past few decades, states and capital interests have struggled to give greater definition to this legal ambiguity through the (re)regulation of maritime space. In the case of contemporary piracy, as we have seen, a combination of multilateral counterpiracy initiatives and the invocation of universal jurisdiction has resulted in attempts at territorialising the sea, thereby securing safe and uninterrupted passage of commercial traffic through the Gulf of Aden. The experiments in global governance have however come across geo-physical obstacles in the flowing sea and in forms of land-based territoriality (essentially sovereign control), which create distinctive problems for those seeking to police the seas -most obviously, how to process suspected pirates captured in the high seas. The result has in most cases been a reconfiguration of the relationship between sovereignty, territory and appropriation that renders piratical waters off the coast of Somalia as a terraqueous zone: both delimited and patrolled, yet also associated to high risk and lawlessness. Responses to contemporary piracy, then, illustrate the tensions and contradictions in creating a world order that (in Carl Schmitt's sense) aligns order and orientation by securing the seaborne circulation of commodities through land-based systems of sovereign rule.
Conclusions
The sea is both a crucial site for the valorisation of capital -be it through extraction or transport -and a major bio-physical obstacle to its reproduction. It is simultaneously a natural resource and an arena of contested social relations; a realm of movement and freedom which nonetheless has been host to the most sophisticated regimes of hierarchical captivity -be these slaving vessels of the past or today's factory fishing ships. We have explored these tensions between capitalism and the sea through the prism of the terrestrial-maritime divide, suggesting that the distinctive features of capitalism as a mode of production constantly seek to transcend the land- For all their differences, all these cases indicate the various ways in which the relation between capitalism and the sea creates distinctive spatial and juridical forms aimed at reconciling the production, appropriation and distribution of value in our terraqueous world. These are always political in the sense that they involve disputes over power (even when agreement is reached) -be they among states, between capital and labour, firms and campaign groups, or a combination of all these. But these political antagonisms over wealth and power, we have argued, acquire a specific character when land meets sea. They are conditioned by the particular interaction between natural forces of the global ocean (its movements, currents, weather-patterns and geographical features) and the social forms typical of industrial capitalism (the integration of the circuit of capital). The terraqueous character of their relationship is both cause and effect of capital's distinctive organisation of sovereignty, territory and appropriation at sea.
